In its ruling of 1 August 2025, Case C-600/23, Royal Football Club Seraing, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) established a fundamental principle: courts of the Member States must be able to exercise an effective and thorough judicial review of arbitral awards rendered by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).

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1. Background of the Case

The case originated in a dispute between the Belgian football club RFC Seraing and FIFA.
The club had entered into financing agreements with the company Doyen Sports, providing for the transfer of a share of the economic rights of certain players — a practice prohibited under FIFA regulations banning the so-called “third-party ownership” (TPO) of players.

After being sanctioned, the club appealed to the CAS, and subsequently to the Swiss Federal Tribunal, without success. The financial sanctions imposed by FIFA were confirmed.

Separately, the Belgian courts had also been seized by the club before the sanctions were imposed. RFC Seraing challenged the legality of FIFA’s TPO rules under both Belgian and EU law. The Francophone Commercial Court declared itself incompetent, and the Court of Appeal dismissed the claims, relying on the res judicata effect of the CAS award confirmed in Switzerland. It held that the club’s arguments on the legality of the measures had already been raised and decided upon in the arbitration and before the Swiss court.

RFC Seraing then appealed to the Belgian Court of Cassation, which referred a preliminary question to the CJEU, asking whether EU law permits such a bar on judicial review in the name of res judicata:

« (1) Does Article 19(1) [TEU], read in conjunction with Article 267 [TFEU] and Article 47 of [the Charter], preclude the application of provisions of national law such as Article 24 and Article 1713 of the [Judicial Code], laying down the principle of res judicata, to an arbitral award the conformity of which with EU law has been reviewed by a court of a State that is not a Member State of the European Union, which is not permitted to refer a question to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling? »

« (2) Does Article 19(1) [TEU], read in conjunction with Article 267 [TFEU] and Article 47 of [the Charter], preclude the application of a rule of national law according probative value vis-à-vis third parties, subject to evidence to the contrary which it is for them to adduce, to an arbitral award the conformity of which with EU law has been reviewed by a court of a State that is not a Member State of the European Union, which is not permitted to refer a question to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling? »

2. The CJEU’s Answer: Clear and Unambiguous

The CJEU’s answer was unequivocal: yes, such national rules are contrary to EU law.

The Court held that Article 19(1) TEU, read together with Articles 267 TFEU and 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding the recognition of res judicata effect on the territory of a Member State in circumstances where:

• The arbitral award (here, a CAS award) relates to an activity of an economic nature carried out within the Union;
• And where its compliance with the principles and provisions forming part of the Union’s public order has not been effectively reviewed by a court of that Member State — a court empowered to refer questions to the CJEU.

« The authority of res judicata from being conferred within the territory of a Member State on an award made by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), in the relations between the parties to the dispute in the context of which that award was made, where that dispute is linked to the pursuit of a sport as an economic activity within the territory of the European Union and the consistency of that award with the principles and provisions of EU law which form part of EU public policy has not first been subject to effective review by a court or tribunal of that Member State that is authorised to make a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling« 

In short, a CAS award confirmed by a Swiss court cannot enjoy unqualified recognition within the Union if its compatibility with EU law has not been effectively examined by a court within the Union’s judicial system.

3. The Primacy of EU Law over National Procedural Barriers

The CJEU ruled that national rules preventing a review of arbitral awards for their compatibility with EU law violate EU law itself.
Such rules deprive individuals — players, clubs, or agents — of their right to an effective judicial remedy, guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

The Court emphasized that an arbitration mechanism unilaterally imposed, such as the CAS system under FIFA statutes, cannot deprive EU economic actors of judicial protection under the Union’s legal order.
Accordingly, national courts must be empowered — either at the parties’ request or ex officio — to assess the compatibility of arbitral awards with the fundamental principles of EU law, notably those concerning the freedom of movement and competition law.

In other words, the Swiss judicial review cannot serve as a substitute for — or a barrier to — the judicial protection guaranteed by the European Union.

4. A Requirement of “Thorough” Review

The CJEU did not question the very principle of sports arbitration. It accepted that the scope of review could be limited to preserve its specific features, but it insisted that the control exercised must remain meaningful and substantive.

National judges must be able to:

• Examine the compatibility of arbitral awards with EU public policy;
• Grant interim or provisional measures, where appropriate;
• And, if necessary, refer preliminary questions to the CJEU.

Judges in Member States are thus called upon to ensure that foreign arbitral awards comply with EU legality — including CAS decisions upheld by Swiss courts.

The CJEU even specified that any national or sporting regulation preventing such review must be disapplied by the national court. A Belgian judge, for instance, could not rely on procedural rules to avoid conducting such a review; he or she would have to set them aside and proceed with the examination.

5. Procedural Consequences and Practical Uncertainties

It remains uncertain how this “effective judicial control” will materialize in practice against CAS or other arbitral awards in the field of sport.

One possibility is that this review could be exercised within the framework of exequatur proceedings, i.e., when recognition or enforcement of the award is sought within the Member State.

However, national courts will have to balance this obligation carefully against the rules of the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, which limits the grounds for refusal of recognition.

6. Towards a Europeanization of Sports Dispute Resolution

The CJEU’s judgment clearly signals the Court’s intention to subject international sports regulations to EU law and to establish enhanced judicial scrutiny where these regulations affect economic activity within the Union.

The RFC Seraing ruling continues a broader trend: the integration of professional sport into the EU legal order, following the path laid by landmark cases such as Meca-Medina and International Skating Union.

The Court’s ultimate goal appears to be to ensure that sports law does not become a “law-free zone” beyond the reach of European legal principles.

It will now be interesting to observe how national and European courts apply this obligation of effective control — and whether a new “match” emerges between the CAS and the Union’s judicial system.

By Olivier Vibert,
Attorney at the Paris Bar